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THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF THE ARMED FORCES ABROAD
Gordon B. Baldwin
My function, as I understand it, is
to further your study of international
law by supplying specific examples of
how it helps, and perhaps hinders,
your work. Your interests are practical
and immediate while mine, as a
teacher, are academic and more remote. So I run the risk of c~nfirming
Mark Twain's remark-"To do good is
noble-to teach good is nobler, and no
trouble. "
Indeed, to practice international law
is far more difficult than to teach it.
You must respond to the demands of
new situations, and the automatic
application of old rules doesn't always
work. Ancient history (which we find
in some of our international law texts
-Colombos' volume on the International Law of the Sea for example)
may be uplifting, but history lacks
relevance without knowing how it
applies to your problems today. So, we
all face a challenge-we, to teach something meaningful, and you, to learn
something useful. This work!> the other
way around too-you teach us, and we
learn. Indeed, even after six years
experience with the International Law
Study, I always come to Newport like
the empty coal car coming to Newcastle-hauling away more than I bring
in. Your questions, your misgivings,
and your commitment to our nation
cnligh ten us and enrich our teaching at
home.

I am going to speak to you of the
legal' problems of U.S. armed forces
abroad as they relate to international
law generally. If you're like your
predecessors here at the War College,
your immediate reaction to the phrase
"international law" is ''There's no such
thing." Just three years ago, Mr.
Katzenbach, now the Attorney General, remarked during this international
law study that he didn't see much
point in debating the subject of
whether international law existed, but
that if he did, he'd be happy to debate
either side. It all depends, he said, on
how one defines law. If Mr. Katzenbach had argued that international law
does not exist (and indeed he did not)
he would be likely to lose, assuming
we define international law in terms of
what lawyers do, and if we define
international law in terms of the tasks
we commonly ask law to perform. In
terms of what law does, international
law relating to your operations in a
foreign country is as real as constitutional law, as criminal law, or as our
traffic laws. What jobs does law do?
Law, I suggest, fulfills four major functions. Law creates rules for allocating
rights to achieve scarce satisfactions.
Law, secondly, establishes working presumptions. Third, law offers us a
process for minimizing violence by
placing in identified hands a legitimate
monopoly of violence. It does this by
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allocating competence to make authoritative decisions and the right to exercise
criminal jurisdiction. Fourth, law contributes a sense of legitimacy to those
who follow the rules and the presumptions, and also to those who exercise
authority. Those who are victims of that
authority are more likely to accept it.
Lefs start by discussing the rules.
A great law teacher and constitutional lawyer, Paul A. Freund, points
out that one of the most successful legal
inventions we have is the white line
drawn down the middle of a highway.
Generally motorists keep to the right of
that line whether or not there's a
policeman and whether or not they
encounter traffic. It's the rare motorist
who deliberately straddles the line.
International agreements, such as the
NATO Status of Forces Agreement,
serve much like the white line down the
highway. There are no policemen, but
the NATO partners follow the rules in
the treaty-for the most part avoiding
head-on collisions. It has been a remarkably successful agreement, and its form
is much imitated-even by the Soviet
Union which has Status of Forces
Agreements with East Germany and
Poland..
In the NATO agreement we have
some very precise rules pertaining to
passport and visa regulations, driving
licenses, uniform regulations, matters of
claims, of taxation and of criminal
jurisdiction. In the two-year-old. Status
of Forces Agreement with Germany,
additional rules relate to aerial photography, hunting and fishing rights, use of
the roads, port facilities, etc.
We don't teach international law, or
any other type of law for that matter,
by asking you to learn a set of rules.
There are too many of them, and
reciting them doesn't give a systematic
picture. You can have lawyers find
them, or you can read the NATO Status
of Forces Agreement, the German Supplemental Agreement, the Japanese
Administrative Agreement, various base

rights agreements, with such countries
as Spain, or one of our several naval
visits agreements. These answer such
questions as:
1. Who commands a jointly used
installation?
2. What rights of entry to the base
area do personnel of the receiving state
enjoy?
3. Who can arrest infractors of
criminal law? Who can punish their
criminal behavior? Does it make any
difference if your men were on liberty
or on leave when the offense occurred?
4. Can the U.S. forces arrest or
detain local inhabitants who in some
manner interfere with the visiting force?
What happens when one of your sentries
shoots a native of the host country? Can
we insist that he only be tried for any
alleged offense by a court martial?
5. Can the U.S. send anyone it
pleases into the host country-or may
the host country exclude Jews or
Negroes? Can the host country impose
curfew regulations, and prevent your
men from fraternizing with local girls?
6. What, if any local taxes should
the members of the U.S. forces pay?
Income taxes? Inheritance taxes? Taxes
imposed to build roads? Radio and TV?
Water services?
7. What civil liability does the U.S.
force or its members have? Are there
any immunities? Who pays for the
damage?
8. What flag or flags can be flown?
9. If inhabitants are hired, what
provisions, if any, of local labor law
must the U.S. follow?
10. Who has authority to negotiate
supplementary agreements and what
powers are delegated to these persons?
11. Who finances the construction in
base areas? Who bears the cost of
maintenance and of furnishing utility
services?
12. May post exchanges, post
offices, commissaries operate? What
privileges and duties are applicable to
them?
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13. Who is responsible for the internal and external security of the area?
14. What are the regulations respecting the use of railroads, roads, dock
facilities and airports?
IS. Who holds title to fixtures,
buildings and other structures constructed for the use of the visiting
force?
16. What goods can be imported, in
what amounts, and what duties, if any,
are payable?
17. How and where can aircraft navigate?
These are only a few of the routine
questions answered in some arrangements we have with a receiving state.
Good lawyers know that drafting to
meet every contingency is difficult, and
they find that to make day-to-day relationships work satisfactorily, detailed
drafting isn't a solution. What is more
important is to establish procedures and
indicate the objectives of settlements
that ought to he made. Lawyers on your
staff ought to he able to do this.
But lawyers can he troublesome.
General Eisenhower thought lawyers
were troublesome when, in 1943, he
rejected a long, technical draft of an
Italian surrender agreement suhmitted
hy his staff. He preferred a short, terse
surrender agreement leaving many issues
hetween Italy and the allied forces
undecided. Some think he was mistaken. However, we have ample evidence that lawyers' documents can he
awfully complicated.
So many prohlems were anticipated
in Germany, for example, that the
agreements effective there in July 1963
comprise over 200 pages of text. Negotiating lasted nearly 10 years, what with
one delay or another, and the result
(like the fine print on the back of an
insurance policy) is a formidable document, complicated, turgid and legalistic.
I suspect it's treated much like the
standard clauses in some contracts.
Lawyers draft them and the husinessmen ignore them. Reading the German

Supplemental Agreement reminds me of
one of the punishments inflicted hy
Gilhert and Sullivan's Mikado: of the
man sentenced to "listen to sermons hy
mystical Germans who preach from IO
to 4." Perhaps it is too detailed. On the
other hand, it's possible also to he too
hrief. The Japanese Peace Treaty confirming United States presence in
Okinawa, for example, states that
pending the estahlishment of some kind
of United Nations trusteeship -there, the
United States has "all and any powers
of administration, legislation and jurisdiction." This is pretty sweeping, hut
when Secretary of State Dulles remarked thereafter that, of course, Japan
retains "residual sovereignty" over those
islands, we authorize Japan's flag to he
flown there and refrain from mounting
a raid on Viet Nam from there. This
only adds confusion. Admittedly another treaty clarifying United States'
rights in the Ryukyu Islands would he
difficult to negotiate. Mayhe it's too
late. However, the existing situation
permits the Japanese to complain that
their residual sovereignty is violated
when occasionally we find it necessary
to use 0 kinawa as a hase for B-S2 raids
over Viet NaIll. My point is that more
detail and less sweeping language in the
Peace Treaty might have heen in United
States national interests.
Now let's note a second function of
law, one more difficult to grasp, but
more important; namely, its use to
establish working presumptions. Law in
any form and in every society performs
a major service hy establishing presumptions which shift the hurden of persuasion hy suggesting that some values
ought to he preferred. We have many
examples: it's presumed a crime to
intentionally kill another unless you can
estahlish some justification; the oceans
are presumed' free for all users, unless
one of the users can establish very good
grounds for excluding others. In our
topic today the basic presumption
seems to he that: the military or naval
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force entering a foreign country is presumed subject to local law and is subject
to the exercise of local enforcement
authority unless it can establish some
good @-:ounds for exemption.
Law also supplies the machinery by
which presumptions can change, and
indeed it has changed here. In the 18th
and 19th centuries visiting military
forces in foreign countries were probably presumed exempt from the host
country's authority. They were treated
almost like diplomats. We have a famous
old Supreme Court case articulating this
presumption-the Schooner Exchange.
But a lot has happened since 1812 when
Justice Marshall rendered that decision.
Foreign armies are no longer sporadic
guests (our forces have been in Europe
for over 20 years). Nationalism
generates resentment against granting
vast immunities to the visitors. The
trend in international law is to inhibit
anything that might be characterized as
aggression and to encourage accountability for all official acts. Moreover,
persistent Communist propaganda
would have the world believe our forces
are engaged in 'a military occupation of
Japan, Western Europe, and the Philippines. All these conditions have contributed to developing a different presumption. When the NATO Alliance was
being organized, both we and our allies
wanted to make it absolutely clear that
United States armed forces in friendly
foreign countries were there as' allies,
not occupiers; that we were partners
with the host country in a joint enterprise, namely, the defense of Europe.
Hence the presumption of immunity
from the exercise of local authority,
which we claimed during World Wars I
and II, was changed by international
legislation, the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement. The Supreme Court of the
United States in the 1957 Girard case
confirmed the new doctrine in holding
that members of United States forces in
foreign lands are subject to the enforcement procedures of local territorial

law, unless some specific international
agreement or some specific rule of
international law holds othenvise.
It seems to me that many of us have
mistaken the presumption, expressed in
several other treaties, for an absolute
rule. Indeed, when the NATO Status of
Forces Agreement was submitted to the
U.S. Senate for its advice and consent,
the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State solemnly declared that the
agreement merely recited general international law in that the host country
always retains territorial jurisdiction
over the visiting United States force.
More recently, I read a statement by an
Army lawyer that the marines landing in
Thailand a few years ago to help defend
that country's border with Laos were
subject to the enforcement jurisdiction
of Thailand. This is a little hard to
believe as it just doesn't make sense for
a combat force, hastily admitted in an
emergency, to have to submit to the risk
that a local law enforcement agency will
arrest members of the force for alleged
criminal behavior. The suggestion of
amenability to local law that we find in
the NATO agreement, and in many
others, is just that: a presumption which
'may be, and has been, rebutted on
several occasions.
Underlying each international agreement establishing a le'gal basis for our
forces abroad is one of four different
conditions, and to meet it the working
assumptions articulated in law must,
and do, vary. Let's look at the four:
L The Peacetime Garrison situation,
typical in Europe, Japan, and Australia:
Here the supremacy of local law reflects
reality. The visiting force is amenable to
local civil and criminal law and to its
enforcement unless the treaty indicates
exceptions which usually relate to
activities done in the course of officinl
duty-not always an easy question to
determine. In a peacetime or garrison
situation, the visiting force does not
require absolute immunity. They do
require some assurance of what

671
procedures and rules should be followed
in the event of disputes, tax claims,
criminal behavior, etc. And the host
country can rightly insist that even if
the visiting force is immune from certain enforcement jurisdiction that the
force should nevertheless obey local
law.
ll. Where the visiting force functions
as if they were diplomats: The agreement of Viet Nam, negotiated in
1950-51, for example, provides for U.S.
military assistance, largely in the form
of supplies and equipment, but it also
covers people who might come to Viet
Nam to help. These people "operate as
part of the Diplomatic Mission" of the
United States, and they are therefore
entitled to one of three categories of
diplomatic immunity. The agreement,
between the U.S., France, Cambodia,
Laos and Viet Nam, negotiated in 1950,
hardly seems relevant today particularly
in view of our undertaking that the
number of persons receiving these privileges "will be kept as low as possible."
Diplomatic immunity is a valuable
privilege intended to enhance international communication. Its nature is well
established by treaty and custom, but it
can be waived, as it was in the recent
unhappy Kimball episode in Viet Nam.
Moreover, diplomatic immunity does
not give its holders a license to flout
local law. In fact, the modern trend is to
require diplomats, like anyone else, to
obey local law. Although they are
exempt from local enforcement procedures, they run the risks of expulsion
or being inconvenienced. New Jersey
claims the right to escort speeding diplomats off its toll roads, and I understand
that the State Department is insisting
that diplomats should follow traffic and
parking regulations.
Obviously the draftsmen of the Viet
Nam agreement did not contemplate
our sending 100,000 armed-to-the-teeth
diplomats. Nevertheless, so far as I can
determine, this is the only agreement
published covering any of our forces

there. To_presume that t~ey are not
only subject to local law, but also the
exercise of local enforcement jurisdiction, is absurd. The facts are that our
forces are engaged in combat. What
presumptions apply then?
ID. The combat situation: A few
weeks after the North Korean invasion
of 1950, we negotiated a one-page
agreement with South Korea stating
that the United Nations forces there
were exempt from arrest and trial by
Korean authorities. Surely this agreement merely articulated a preexisting
presumption of immunity. The agreement goes further, however-there's a
curious provision stating that "unless
required by the nonexistence of local
courts, courts of the United States
forces will not try nationals of the
Republic of Korea." Does this mean
that the United States might claim the
right, in the absence of a-ftinctioning
host country judiciary, to subject local
inhabitants to trial by court-martial or
military commission? This raises some
interesting questions involving the interplay of the laws of war, the Geneva
conventions and of the United States
Constitution. We can make a case for
that power, but I personally doubt
whether that argument would be sustained by the Supreme Court today,
the Yamashita 1 Case, Madsen v. Kinsella, 2 to the contrary notwithstanding.
Perhaps my colleagues could grapple
with that problem. It may be a real One
in view of the fourth situation.
IV. The "Quasi-combat" or "peacekeeping" situation.
I don't know how else to characterize the legal status of our forces in
the Dominican Republic. Heretofore,
foreign armed forces legally entered a
country with either the consent of the
host country, or at the behest of an
international organization such as the
UN. The United Nations in the Congo
and in the near Eash-'have actually
negotiated status of forces agreements.
Quite aside from the issue of whether or
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not any of these forces entered lawfully
or not, the presumption favoring local
jurisdiction is not applicable. There is
no local jurisdiction by definition-the
local order has collapsed-lives are in
danger, and in the Dominican crisis the
commander in chief made a political
decision requiring you to prevent an
intolerable Communist take-over.
In this situation, we actually have a
pair of complementary presumptions.
One, to ensure that the host country
must not interfere with the force's
mission, we presume an immunity from
the exercise of authority by anyone
else. The second operating assumption is
that the United States remains internationally responsible for the acts of its
agents. Principles of state responsibility
persist. If property is taken, it should be
paid for; if inhabitants are hired, they
must be compensated; if men are imprisoned, it must be through a process
of law; and if force is asserted, it should
be exercised responsibly and reasonably.
Running deep in international relations is the theme that national power is
accountable-that if unilateral action is
taken, it must still conform to the
demands of international law. This is
certainly the United States position,
restated regularly by the President, confirmed for you also in Navy Regulations. Furthermore, it is a demand that
we make of others.
How do we operate with these pairs
of presumptions in a military operation
directed at "peace-keeping''? If you are
planning one, you would be wise to
include provisions for the settlement of
claims. You have ample authority in
United States law to do this under the
Foreign Claims Act. You may recall that
the Foreign Claims Act was passed by
Congress in April 1918 to pay inhabitants of France for damages caused
to them by members of our forces. It
was amended in 1943 and 1956 to
permit payments up to $15,000 to
foreign inhabitants. It is the authority
for the payment for damages to real or

personal property, to life and limb
caused by, or incident to, noncombat
activities of the armed forces. Damages
are determined by local law, and naturally will differ considerably from comparable damages in the United States.
Careful and consistent use of the Foreign Claims Act's provision may very
well improve your relations with local
inhabitants and counteract Communist
propaganda. For example, I understand
that in the Lebanon operation, olive
groves were damaged by bivouacing
marines: Olive trees grow slowly and
may supply the owner's entire income.
The Foreign Claims Act was used to
compensate the owner for destroyed
olive groves, with damages calculated
according to local law.
If you can distinguish between the
presumptions of law and the rules of
law, you may find international law a
little easier to grasp. You must recognize that applying presumptions to concrete problems can nevertheless be difficult; but it is also difficult to deal with
problems without generalizations. We
express the conviction in our legal order
that decisions based solely on the
appealing uniqueness of a human situation cannot supply the values or the
continuity needed to give meaning and
satisfaction. When we decide single
problems, we look for general principles
and for guides with some universal
application. It is also true that we
distrust large generalities as guides to
our conduct, and put our fa.ith in
wisdom and techniques learned by
doing. Law, therefore, supplies a means
for maintaining a creative tension between propositions and particular
instances.
The third function of law in my
analysis is that law supplies a process for
minimizing violence by placing in identified hands a legitimate monopoly of
power. It does this by allocating competence to make decisions.
The risk of confusion and the threat
of violence is substantial when the U.S.
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sends into the territory of another
nation a pretty much self-sufficient
body of men, capable of asserting enormous power, subject to their own internal discipline, and carrying with them
their own culture in the form of movies,
post exchanges, and clubs. The host
country is independent, with pride in its
own culture, and its inhabitants may
resent the strangers and their curious
ways.
We have in our own history several
illustrations of these tensions. The
"Boston Massacre" of 1770, for example. You may recall that the offending soldiers were tried in a colonial
court, defended by John Adams, the
colony's leading lawyer, and they were
acquitted.
A second illustrative incident is the
Thierchens case. Shortly before the
United States entered World War I, we
prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned
the captain of a German Navy cruiser
for smuggling, and also for a curious
violation of the Mann Act. The Federal
Court rejected the officer's pleas that he
was immune from the enforcement
jurisdiction of the United States. It's
hard to reconcile the claim the United
States made in this case with the comparable and contemporaneous Tampico
incident involving the arrest by Mexican
police of Admiral Mayo's barge crew in
Tampico, Mexico. The men were
eventualIy released, but Admiral Mayo
demanded an apology and a salute to
the United States flag. When the Mexicans refused, he seized the port.
These unpleasant incidents could not
be prevented by an international agreement, but the disputes which foIIowed
could have been eased if some sort of
status of forces agreement or a naval
visits agreement existed. Accommodation and compromise can be achieved
in advance when you have a general idea
of the risks, and you know what law can
do. International agreements can confirm the right of a United States courtmartial to act in the host country, and

can make that court's authority exclusive. The competence of the host country's police, judiciary, and tax authorities can be outlined. The method for
settling day-to-day tensions can be
specified by claims provisions, liaison
procedures, and other rules outlining
mutual expectations.
The sets. of compromises which we
might call international law are worked
out because participants think that the
cost of continued disagreement is too
great, and that the price paid in the
form of some deference to the views
and interests of others is acceptable..
The gains realized are less confusion, a
diminished risk of violence, and the
reasonable expectation that the other
feIIow may, to gain similar advantage,
behave similarly. We make international
law because we hope to create conditions in which the behavior of others is
more predictable.
Where international law does not
serve mutual advantage, it becomes
weak-even meaningless. Our status of
forces agreement of 1950 with South
Korea, for example, does not seem
pertinent to the conditions there today
(at least so the Koreans believe), so we
have negotiated a new agreement. Quite
rightly I think. Perhaps we have other
international agreements affecting your
privileges overseas which are also obsolete in that they appear to be one-sided.
It's impossible to avoid renegotiation
indefinitely. Therefore, treaties with
perpetual provisions are probably not
realistic.
From all this you may quickly conclude that international law is merely a
front in that "nations really do what
they want to do." To this I reply, "Yes,
but what nations want to do, that is
what actions and policies they in fact
foIIow, are very likely to be influenced
by law, and by what lawyers say is law. "
This is particularly true among the
United States and its friends in the
western world, hut even the Soviet
Union and Red China use legal language
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in supporting their own views and interests, and what those views and interests are, may well be conditioned by
"law." Russia, for example, has negotiated status of forces agreements.with
Poland and with East Germany. I don't
think Red China has any, but if they do
place major units in Viet Nam, it would
not be surprising if they did negotiate
some sort of "status of forces" agreement with Ho-Chi-Minh.
The law of visiting armed forces is
largely treaty law today. Its rules, procedures and legitimizing force is found
in dozens of international agreements
negotiated in the last 15 years. It is
treaty law rather than customary law
because of the fourth function of law,
namely; that law "legitimizes." Law is
valued not as an end in itself, but as a
means to serve human life. Community
consensus holds nations, and their officials, accountable for their use of
power-however powerful the nation,
and however high or insignificant the
official, and however important the
declared objective. When force is used
so as not to serve human life, it is
considered improper-illegitimate. A
legal basis for the presence of the
visiting force and legal grounds for its
assertion of power, far from its national
home, helps supply this sense of acceptance-this sense of legitimacy.
Without a legal basis for the presence
of forces, their activity would create
more tension, more resentment and
more confusion, both in the host country and in the United States. Aliens
everywhere can be mistrusted; if they
are armed, occupy valuable land, and
occasionally exhibit the exuberance of
youth, their presence can be divisive to
an alliance.
Without an international agreementwithout the consent of the host country-it is hard to justify a foreign base.
When Zanzibar demanded that NASA
dismantle the tracking station-we did
so; when Morocco demanded that we

leave our bases there-we agreed; and we
apparently will also leave Libya. On
occasion, we utilize overseas bases without confirming international agreement,
as in the Azores, for example, but
nevertheless it is clear that we enjoy the
consent of the Portuguese.
A legal basis for the presence of
visiting forces also helps here at home.
For example, our decision to send
troops into the Dominican Republic was
unilateral. I am not concerned here
whether that decision was wise or
foolish. It is clear, however, that the
firmer that decision rests in internationallaw, the more likely that decision
will be accepted by the U.S. public, that
elusive thing "world opinion," and by
the Dominicans. It would make a neater
legal case, for example, if the marines
landed at the invitation of the host
government. We could then persuasively
claim with some justification that the
Dominican situation was similar to the
Lebanon crisis of 1958. Unfortunately,
I gather that no one in the Dominican
Republic with any color of authority
wanted publicly to invite U.S. forces.
So the United States' legal case must
rest on more controversial grounds,
and the legal basis is harder to define.
If I have raised questions of the
philosophy of law, I must apologize
because about all I can remember of
that subject is the definition of a
philosopher-a philosopher is a blind
man in a dark cellar at midnight looking
for a black cat that isn't there. He is
distinguished from a theologian in that
the theologian finds the cat. He is also
distinguished from a lawyer. The lawyer
smuggles in a cat under his overcoat and
emerges to produce it in triumph.
So if I have given you a philosophy
of law, this definition makes me a
theologian. You could call me a lawyer,
but if I were the type to smuggle
something in, surely the War College
would not invite me here.
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NOTES
1. In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), involved the war crimes trial of Gen. Yamashita for
certain massacres and atrocities committed by Japanese forces under his command during World
War II. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the United States Military Commission
in Manila had jurisdiction to try Gen. Yamashita for those war crimes.
2. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952), concerned trials in enemy territory which had
been conquered and held by force of arms and which was being governed at the time by U.S.
military forces. The U.S. Supreme Court held that in such areas the U.S. Army commander could
establish military or civilian commissions as an arm of the occupation to try everyone in the
occupied area, whether they were connected with the Army or not.
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